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A Case for Law As Rhetoric,
Not As Political Theology
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The act of metaphor then was a thrust at truth and a lie, depending where you
were: inside, safe, or outside, lost. Oedipa did not know where she was.1
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I.
An essay written in the United States today with “sovereignty” in the title is
almost obligated to mention, as I am about to, Carl Schmitt. That was not always
the case. A standard reference work for political thought published in 1987 went
from Frederick Schiller to Joseph Schumpeter, leaving out Schmitt.2 David
Luban’s Lexis search revealed five law review references to Schmitt from 1980
through 1990, and 420 from 2000 through 2010, with almost twice as many from
2006 through 2010 as in the five previous years.3
There are multiple reasons for this increased interest, but the most obvious is
the United States’ response to 9/11. A thinker who conceives of the political as a

* Chancellor’s Professor, English, University of California, Irvine.
1. THOMAS PYNCHON, THE CRYING OF LOT 49, at 105 (First Perennial Classics ed. 1999)
(1965).
2. THE BLACKWELL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, 466–67 (David Miller et al.
eds., 1987); see Tracy B. Strong, Foreword to CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL, at ix,
xii (George Schwab trans., Univ. Chi. Press expanded ed. 2007) (1932).
3. David Luban, Carl Schmitt and the Critique of Lawfare, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 457, 468
(2010).
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contest between friends and enemies and who defines the sovereign as “he who
decides on the exception”4 is well suited for those engaging some of the most
hotly debated legal issues in a post-9/11 world, especially because “exception” is a
translation for Ausnahmenzustand, which in German means the “state of
emergency” in martial law. Neoconservatives can turn to him for powerful
intellectual justification of Bush administration policies. Leftists can use him to
expose how liberal, pluralistic democracy’s pretensions to rule by law are built on a
foundation of the sovereign’s exceptional use of force.
Schmitt’s impact is evident in the call for papers for this symposium. Among
the topics listed for “empirical inquiry” is “sacrality/profanity: investigation of
law’s dueling ontologies, derived on the one hand from the realm of divinity and
sovereignty (the transcendental), and on the other from the realm of disposition
and administration (the governmental).”5 The identification of sovereignty with
the sacred in no small measure derives from Schmitt’s claim that “[a]ll significant
concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts.”6
In this Article I want to test some of Schmitt’s influential claims about political
theology, sovereignty, and the law.
Because my approach might seem a bit idiosyncratic—if not exceptional—I
need to take a moment to explain it. The Schmitt boom in the United States has
two primary sources. One is American scholars trained in continental thought.
Since Schmitt’s death in 1985, they have made his work available in translation,
and they have responded to and explained his importance for continental thinkers
such as Jacques Derrida, Chantel Mouffe, Étienne Balibar, and—especially—
Giorgio Agamben, who has stressed Schmitt’s engagement with Walter Benjamin.
The other source is legal scholars like Oren Gross, Mark Tushnet, John Ferejohn,
and Pasquale Pasquino, who rely on the other scholars’ accounts of Schmitt to
debate his merits for understanding the legal ramifications of post-9/11
antiterrorism policy.7 As important as that work and those debates are, I am not
going to engage either extensively. What I want to do instead is look at an aspect
of Schmitt’s work that both tend to neglect. The introduction to the first
translation of Political Theology reports that, “because Schmitt was regarded in
England and America as . . . a Nazi theoretician,”8 he had long been neglected in
the English-speaking world. In fact, in his influential book, Constitutional
Dictatorship, Clinton Rossiter engaged Schmitt with no mention of his Nazi
connections.9 Rossiter dedicates his book to his former professor, Edward

4. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF
SOVEREIGNTY 1 (George Schwab trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2005) (1922).
5. Call for papers (on file with author).
6. SCHMITT, supra note 4, at 36.
7. For a summary of this debate, see William E. Scheuerman, Survey Article: Emergency Powers
and the Rule of Law After 9/11, 14 J. POL. PHIL. 61, 64 n.11, 70 (2006).
8. See George Schwab, Introduction to SCHMITT, supra note 4, at xl.
9. CLINTON ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP (1948).
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Corwin, the famous constitutional scholar and uncompromising advocate of
presidential power. It is no accident that Rossiter’s work, like Schmitt’s, has been
revisited in the post-9/11 world. It is also no accident that Agamben prematurely
dismisses Rossiter while some of the most important legal counters to Schmitt rely
on him.10
But it is not only the case that an American, like Rossiter, engaged Schmitt
before the present boom. Schmitt himself cites American examples. That he does
so is not surprising. First, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries there
was an extensive exchange between American and German-speaking thinkers
about sovereignty. Schmitt’s work grows out of that exchange. Second, whereas
one of Schmitt’s best American critics called the Weimar era the “most notorious
crisis in the history of constitutional democracy,”11 a case could be made that the
American Civil War and its Reconstruction aftermath was a pretty significant crisis
as well, one that raised fundamental questions about sovereignty and the use of
special powers in times of emergency. Schmitt knew this and strategically, if not
extensively, cited American examples from this period to provide perspective for
his own troubled times.
My critique of Schmitt follows from placing him in that transatlantic
tradition and evaluating his neglected comments on the American scene. My first
goal is historical. I want to resurrect the transatlantic exchange that helped shape
Schmitt’s ideas, explaining why the period of the Civil War and Reconstruction
was important for theorists of sovereignty and Schmitt in particular. Given the
limits of time and space, I will focus particularly on John W. Burgess, a now
neglected figure, who in his day was the foremost expert on sovereignty in the
United States. Although this part of my Article looks to the past, it has
implications for Schmitt’s reception in post-9/11 America. Schmitt’s interventions
into Weimar debates and his subsequent embrace of the Nazi party cause
neoconservatives to evoke him with caution. For instance, Eric A. Posner and
Adrian Vermeule pointedly claim that “Weimar has received too much
attention”12 in post-9/11 debates. “Civil libertarians invoke the shadow of Weimar
to imply, and occasionally say, that expanding government’s powers during
emergencies will produce another Hitler. It will not, in today’s liberal democracies
anyway . . . .”13 At the same time, neoconservatives frequently and favorably cite
the example of Lincoln and various Reconstruction measures. In contrast, given
Lincoln’s majestic reputation and the commendable goals of Radical
Reconstruction, Civil War and Reconstruction examples are complicated for those
on the left, while Schmitt’s Nazi connections make reference to him politically

10. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 6–9 (Kevin Attell trans., Univ. of Chi. Press
2005) (2003); see Scheuerman, supra note 7, at 80.
11. John P. McCormick, Introduction to CARL SCHMITT, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY, at xiii
(Jeffrey Seitzer ed. & trans., 2004).
12. ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE 39 (2007).
13. Id.
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useful. What gets neglected in all this is Schmitt’s own use of American examples
and the way in which American theorists of sovereignty at the time, like Burgess,
viewed emergency powers.
My second goal is more theoretical than historical, although it relies on my
historical evidence. I use a comparison between Schmitt and Burgess to take
exception to Schmitt’s influential claim that we should understand law as political
theology. I will argue instead that it is more productive to affirm the traditional
understanding of law as rhetoric. To understand law as rhetoric will, I hope, place
some gentle pressure on one goal of this symposium, which is to place pressure on
doing legal history by looking at law and something else, such as society, religion,
economics, culture, etc. For instance, the call for “law as . . .” proposed imagining
law and something else as the same phenomenon.14 But to think of “law as . . .” is
to think metaphorically. We turn to metaphor because of a failure of self-identity.
Metaphoric language consists of tropes, a term etymologically linked to the Greek
word for “turn” or “turning.” We use “turns of speech” when we cannot name
things directly. Schmitt suggests at least one implication of this insight for the law
through his important distinction between legality and legitimacy. The legitimacy
of rule by law, he insists, can never be found within the law itself.15 Thus, he turns
to political theology. Recent scholars intent on challenging the widespread
Weberian disenchantment of the law have followed him. By turning instead to
rhetoric, I am not claiming a relationship of identity. But I am suggesting that
political theology is not the only place to turn for an alternative to the relentless
hermeneutics of suspicion that has characterized much recent critical legal history.
I also want to highlight the rhetorical implications of different attempts to define
the law metaphorically. Not all metaphors are the same.
My rhetorical/historical approach and its use of American examples are not
meant to downplay the importance of understanding Schmitt through a
continental lens. In fact, my challenge to Schmitt’s political theology relies on
Hans Blumenberg, a major—though neglected in the United States—continental
thinker. Nonetheless, comparing Schmitt with an American predecessor can
provide a different perspective on issues of sovereignty and political theology. For
one, it highlights how exceptional Schmitt’s theory of sovereignty was in the
context of the transatlantic exchange out of which it emerged. In contrast,
Burgess’s definition was much more conventional. For him, the sovereign is “that
which imposes the limitation.”16 But despite—or perhaps because of—its
conventionality, Burgess’s definition can, I will argue, help us see the limits of
Schmitt’s much more provocative definition. In my last section, I try to back up
that claim by briefly looking at the rhetorical implications of understanding
14. See Catherine L. Fisk & Robert W. Gordon, Foreword: “Law As . . .”: Theory and Method in
Legal History, 1 UC IRVINE L. REV. 519 (2011) (symposium issue).
15. McCormick, supra note 11.
16. 1 JOHN W. BURGESS, POLITICAL SCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SOVEREIGNTY AND LIBERTY 53 (Boston, Ginn & Co. 1890).
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sovereignty in terms of exceptions and limits for three controversial constitutional
issues today whose roots can be traced to the Reconstruction and postReconstruction era. The first is the constitutionality of the trials of those accused
of terrorism at Guantanamo. Whereas a number of people have turned to Schmitt
mediated through Agamben to analyze those trials, I will argue that we get a much
better understanding of the Bush—and to a certain extent the Obama—
administration policies by tracing Burgess’s response to the landmark case of Ex
parte Milligan, mediated through Corwin and Rossiter.17 The other two involve
immigration, which Susan Coutin, Justin Richland, and Véronique Fortin analyze
in depth in their essay,18 and the national debt, loosely related to Christopher
Tomlins’ somewhat different concerns about capitalism and debt.19
II.
Carl Schmitt was born in 1888 and grew up a devout Roman Catholic in
Westphalia. He studied law in Berlin, Munich, and Strasburg, moving on to an
academic career that was interrupted by military service in World War I. Although
Catholicism remained important for him, he was excommunicated for a second
marriage after the church failed to recognize his divorce. His most important work
resulted from his participation in debates over the Weimar government. Soon
after Hitler came to power in 1933, Schmitt joined the Nazi party and held various
official posts until 1936, when infighting ousted him from positions of power. At
the end of World War II, he spent a year in an internment camp, refusing efforts
at de-Nazification. Barred from academia, he continued to write, give lectures in
Franco’s Spain, and remain intellectually connected with people interested in his
work. Whether Schmitt’s membership in the Nazi party was opportunistic or
sincere remains as hotly debated as the extent to which his ideas can be separated
from his Nazi connections. What is certain is that although he remained a staunch
conservative, in his later years he had personal correspondence with thinkers
across the political spectrum, such as Blumenberg, Leo Strauss, Ernst Juenger,
Jacob Taubes, and Alexander Kojeve.
Much older than Schmitt, Burgess was born in 1844. A native of Tennessee,
he courageously resisted enlistment in the Confederate army and fought for the
Union. After the war, he studied at Amherst College and then in Germany. He has
been called the “father” of American political science, both because of his
scholarship and because of his creation of the School of Political Science at
Columbia University.20 A practicing lawyer, he simultaneously taught at the

17. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866)
18. Susan Bibler Coutin et al., Routine Exceptionality: The Plenary Power Doctrine, Immigrants, and the
Indigenous Under U.S. Law, 4 UC IRVINE L. REV. 97, 101–05 (2014).
19. Christopher Tomlins, Demonic Ambiguities: Enchantment and Disenchantment in Nat Turner's
Virginia, 4 UC IRVINE L. REV. 175, 176 (2014).
20. ALBERT SOMIT & JOSEPH TANENHAUS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN POLITICAL
SCIENCE 3 (Irvington Publishers 1982) (1967).

244

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:239

Columbia Law School. Active in founding the Academy of Political Science and
its major journal, he hired wisely, adding to the faculty—among others—Edwin
Seligmen, James Harvey Robinson, Charles Beard, and William A. Dunning of the
infamous “Dunning school” of Reconstruction studies. Burgess cemented his
academic reputation with his monumental Political Science and Comparative
Constitutional Law (1890), followed by influential studies of the constitutional issues
related to the Civil War and Reconstruction. If people know of him today, what
most know is that he, like Dunning, should not be read. No one is more
responsible for that view than W.E.B. Du Bois, who condemns Burgess and
Dunning in his book Black Reconstruction. With good reason, Du Bois singles out
Burgess’s racism more than Dunning’s. Indeed, if Burgess is cited today, the
citation is almost always to a racist passage Du Bois drew attention to years ago.21
Yet, despite Burgess’s racism, there are reasons for reading him carefully.
Creating a somewhat distorted account himself by calling Burgess an exConfederate, Du Bois concedes that his account is “more than fair in law,”
adding, “subtract from [him] his belief that only white people can rule, and he is in
essential agreement with me.”22 What makes Burgess provide a fair account of the
law of the Reconstruction era is his view of sovereignty derived from his proUnion beliefs and his studies in Germany. In the end, his loyalty to Germany,
much more than the racism that offended Du Bois, discredited him in his lifetime
because of his opposition to the United States’ entry into World War I. Before the
war, however, he was famous enough to be named the first Roosevelt Visiting
Professor at the University of Berlin. In Berlin 1906–1907, Burgess gave a large
lecture course in German on the constitutional history of the United States and a
graduate seminar in English on American constitutional law.
Just missing direct contact with Burgess, Schmitt began his studies in Berlin
in the fall of 1907. Even though Schmitt did not have direct contact with Burgess,
his theories of sovereignty came out of the transatlantic exchange that influenced
and was influenced by the Columbia professor who dedicated his major work to
Professor Johann Gustav Droysen. The influence of Germany on nineteenthcentury America is well documented, but the exchange was not confined to one
direction. There was a practical reason for German interest in American
constitutional history and theory. German unification had created a federal state.
German theorists, therefore, turned to the United States and its efforts to
understand sovereignty in a federal context.23 Prior to the Civil War, most people
agreed with The Federalist Papers that in the United States sovereignty was divided
between the nation and individual states. This belief was affirmed in Chisholm v.
Georgia (1793), in which the Court declared that “[t]he United States [is] sovereign
as to all the powers of Government actually surrendered: Each State in the Union
21. See, e.g., PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM 75 (photo. reprint 2008) (1988).
22. W.E.B. DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 720, 726 (1935).
23. See, e.g., SIEGFRIED BRIE, DER BUNDESSTAAT (Leipzig, Verlag von Wilhelm Engelmann
1874); see also HUGO PREUSS, GEMEINDE, STAAT, REICH (photo. reprint 1964) (1889).
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is sovereign as to all the powers reserved.”24 Joseph Story explained how
sovereignty could be divided by noting two different uses of the term. Sovereignty
in “its largest sense is meant, supreme, absolute, uncontrollable power, the jus
summi imperii, the absolute right to govern.”25 But the term is also used in a more
limited sense to refer to “such political powers, as in the actual organization of the
particular state or nation are to be exclusively exercised by certain public
functionaries, without the control of any superior authority.”26 For Story, as for
Daniel Webster and Lincoln, the nation was sovereign in the absolute sense, and
individual states in the more limited sense.
That view was challenged by John C. Calhoun, who argued that sovereignty
could not be divided. Sovereignty, he claimed, is “an entire thing;—to divide, is,—
to destroy it.”27 For him, individual states alone were sovereign. Calhoun
responded to the Constitution’s explicit division of powers between the national
and state governments by distinguishing governmental functions held, for
instance, by the executive and legislative branches, from sovereignty itself.
Emanating from the sovereign state, but not identical to it, these governmental
powers could be divided, as they had been when states delegated some of their
capacities to the federal government. But the delegation was by no means a
cession of sovereignty.
Francis Lieber, whose first academic position was in Calhoun’s South
Carolina and later taught at Columbia, agreed that sovereignty could not be
divided. But he located it in the nation, not individual states. He did so by relying
on two ideas he brought with him from Germany. Despite their disagreements,
both Calhoun and Webster believed that the people, not a monarch, were
sovereign. In Germany, however, reaction to the French Revolution’s claim to
popular sovereignty led to the idea that the state, not the people or a monarch,
was sovereign. To be sure, the state was linked to the people, but not, as
conceived of in the United States, as an aggregate of contracting individuals. It
was instead a Gesamtperson, whose character was greater than the sum of its parts
embodying a corporate personality. Because of linguistic confusion caused by the
claims of individual “states” to be sovereign, Lieber described this sovereignty to
be located in the nation, not the state. Nonetheless, with the idea of an organic
nation-state, he tried to counter the feeling described by Tocqueville that “[t]he
sovereignty of the Union is an abstract being that is attached to only a few external
objects,” while that of the states

24. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 435 (1793).
25. HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER, LECTURES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 33 (Richmond,
Shepherd & Colin 1843).
26. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 207, at 192 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833).
27. JOHN C. CALHOUN, A DISQUISITION ON GOVERNMENT 146 (Richard K. Cralle ed.,
Charleston, Steam Power-Press of Walker and James 1851).
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comes before all the senses; one comprehends it without difficulty; one
sees it act at each instant. . . . The sovereignty of Union is the work of art.
The sovereignty of the states is natural; it exists by itself without effort,
like the authority of the father of a family.28
Nathaniel Hawthorne expresses similar sentiments, describing the country’s
“anomaly of two allegiances (of which that of the State comes nearest home to a
man’s feelings, and includes the altar and the hearth, while the General
Government claims his devotion only to an airy mode of law, and has no symbol
but a flag).”29 Lincoln tries to alter such feelings in the First Inaugural by
describing national “bonds of affection . . . stretching from every battle-field, and
patriot grave, to every living heart and hearthstone, all over this broad land.”30 In a
different register, Lieber’s idea of a collective people embodied in an organic
nation-state tried to do the same.
With the victory of the Union, Lieber’s argument would seem to have
prevailed, and to a certain extent it did, although—as we will see—the question of
national and state sovereignty remained a thorny one. It also remained a subject
for debate in the German-speaking world. The German Confederation created in
1815 consisted of forty sovereign states. Like the United States under the Articles
of Confederation, it was a Staatenbund, not a Bundesstaat. But, as the move toward
German unification took force, the relationship between these states and a federal
state was unresolved. In 1853, Georg Waitz developed an influential theory of
divided sovereignty, similar to antebellum theories in the United States. But
Bismarck’s political push toward unification placed pressure on that theory. If
Waitz argued that individual states and the federal state were sovereign in different
spheres, the question arose as to who determines the boundaries of those spheres.
In 1868, Georg Meyer’s answer was that a state is sovereign when it has the power
to determine its own jurisdiction. With the formation of the German Empire four
years later, Meyer added that sovereignty lies in the constitution-making power,
which is superior to both central and state governments. Or, put another way, lack
of a legal superior constitutes sovereignty. As Paul Laband put it in 1876, if you
want to know who is sovereign, you simply ask who has the power to determine
the limits of jurisdiction for a community.31
Although this theory of undivided sovereignty had many followers, it was

28. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 157–58 (Harvey C. Mansfield &
Delba Winthrop eds. & trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2000) (1835).
29. Nathaniel Hawthorne, Chiefly About War-Matters, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1862, at 48.
30. 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 271 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
31. Recently, a number of scholars have argued that jurisdiction is more important than
sovereignty. See, e.g., Shaun McVeigh & Sundhya Pahuja, Rival Jurisdictions: The Promise and Loss of
Sovereignty, in AFTER SOVEREIGNTY: ON THE QUESTION OF POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 97, 97–114
(Charles Barbour & George Pavlich eds., 2010). Yet in this period, the two are intricately related
because sovereignty was defined as the power to determine jurisdiction. See BRADIN CORMACK, A
POWER TO DO JUSTICE 288–89 (2007); Juris-Dictions, ENGLISH LANGUAGE NOTES, Fall/Winter
2010, at 1.
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challenged by Otto von Gierke. Gierke’s views of sovereignty grew out of his
extensive research into the history of German laws of associations, including
groups like medieval guilds. His research challenged a number of assumptions of
those trained primarily in Roman law and the Roman influence on the Napoleonic
code. Romans, according to Gierke, conceived of both an absolute and indivisible
person and state. The state was unlimited in the realm of public law, and the
individual person in that of private law. But this left no human associations
between the individual and the state. In contrast, German Genossenschaftrecht
focused on the communal groups above the individual and below the state. These
groups, comprising what today we would call civil society, were as important for
an individual’s sense of identity as his or her relation to the state. Indeed, for
Gierke, “‘men everywhere and at all times has borne a double character, that of an
individual as such and that of a member of a community.’”32 Similarly, sovereignty
can have a double character. For Gierke, the state does not rule over the law or
the law over the state. Instead, the two are equal powers, inconceivable without
one another.
Extending Gierke’s work, Hugo Preuss raised important questions about the
idea of absolute sovereignty by looking at relations above and below the state.
First, he argued that it was incompatible with developments in international law,
which would place certain restrictions on individual states. Second, it was
incompatible with the existence of communal groups within the state who have
existences, at least in part, independent of the state. As a result, Preuss argued that
the idea of sovereignty, while useful to describe the absolutist state of Bodin,
should be abandoned in relation to the modern state.
Gierke and his influence on Preuss are important for my argument for two
reasons. First, both are prime targets of Schmitt in Political Theology. True to his
Roman Catholic upbringing, Schmitt strongly believed in an absolute, indivisible
sovereign. He is especially dismissive of Preuss. Helping to frame the Weimar
Constitution, Preuss, staying true to the “associationalist” beliefs he learned from
Gierke, tried to make sure that communities between the state and the individual
had sufficient power. For Schmitt those assurances devastatingly weakened the
power of the state. The second reason for Gierke’s importance has to do with the
transatlantic exchange about sovereignty that I have briefly outlined. Bringing us
almost to the start of Schmitt’s career, it is analyzed and explicated in detail in the
first book by Charles E. Merriam, Jr., considered the “father” of behavioral
political science. Merriam wrote much of the book while studying with Gierke in
Berlin. He was sent there by Dunning, who was his dissertation director. At the
time, Dunning was turning his attention from Reconstruction to a multivolume
history of political theory. Merriam also acknowledges the importance of seminars
he took with Burgess, who, reversing the direction of Dunning’s career, was at

32. CHARLES EDWARD MERRIAM, JR., HISTORY OF THE THEORY OF SOVEREIGNTY SINCE
ROUSSEAU 59 (1900) (quoting Otto von Gierke).
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work on Reconstruction and the Constitution, published in 1902, two years after
Merriam’s History of the Theory of Sovereignty since Rousseau.33 It is time, therefore, to
turn to the relation between Burgess’s theory of state sovereignty and his
understanding of Reconstruction.
III.
According to Burgess, a proper answer to legal questions of Reconstruction
and its aftermath cannot be achieved without clarifying the “proper conception of
what a ‘State’ is in a system of federal government.”34 Confusion arises because of
the tendency to confound the idea of a “State” in such a system with a
state pure and simple. Until the distinction between the two is clearly
seen and firmly applied, no real progress can be made in the theory and
practice of the federal system of government. Now the fundamental
principle of a state pure and simple is sovereignty, the original, innate,
and legally unlimited power to command and enforce obedience by the
infliction of penalties for disobedience. On the other hand, the nature of
a “State” in a system of federal government is a very different thing. Such
a “State” is a local self-government, under the supremacy of the general
constitution, and possessed of residuary powers.35
Individual states, Burgess felt, should be called “[c]ommonwealth[s]”36 or placed
in quotation marks to distinguish them from real states.
Burgess’s views of sovereignty made him a harsh critic of Lincoln’s and
Andrew Johnson’s presidential plan for Reconstruction. First, he felt that the
Constitution clearly indicated that Congress, not the executive branch, should
have presided over Reconstruction. Second, he dismissed Lincoln’s insistence that
the rebellious states never left the Union, that it was not states that rebelled but
the act of combinations of disloyal persons. In contrast, Burgess felt that Charles
Sumner’s doctrine of “state suicide”37 was “sound political science and correct
constitutional law.”38 Since individual states depend on the nation for their
existence, the moment rebellious states voted for secession, they ceased to exist as
states. Their populations and territories continued to be under the control of the
nation, but, as with any populations or territories not organized as states, they
were “subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress”39 and could be readmitted

33. JOHN W. BURGESS, RECONSTRUCTION AND THE CONSTITUTION, 1866-1876 (1902);
MERRIAM, JR., supra note 32, at v.
34. BURGESS, supra note 33, at 1–2.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 3.
37. WILLIAM ARCHIBALD DUNNING, ESSAYS ON THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION
105 (1904).
38. BURGESS, supra note 33, at 60.
39. DUNNING, supra note 37, at 105.
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to the Union as states only in accord with procedures outlined in the Constitution
that gave special powers to Congress over territories.40
Given their belief that “states” themselves had never left the Union,
Presidents Lincoln and Johnson felt that the major work needed for
Reconstruction was simply restoration of local governments within the states.
Given his belief in the doctrine of “‘state’ suicide,”41 Burgess felt that was
inadequate. In fact, for him, even Radical Reconstruction was not radical enough.
To be sure, the South was divided into military districts, but “states” persisted
under what Dunning called the “theory of forfeited rights.”42 The boundaries and
jurisdiction of the formerly rebellious states remained in place, but were
temporarily in “suspended animation.”43
In disagreeing with the actual course that Reconstruction took, Burgess did
not confine his criticism to congressional Republicans. He also targeted the
Supreme Court. For instance, in Texas v. White (1869), Chief Justice Chase,
Lincoln’s former secretary of the treasury, memorably declared, “The
Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of
indestructible States.”44 When Justice Matthews in the 1884 Virginia Coupon Cases
cited Chase, Burgess compared Matthews’s logic to “Dogberry’s charge to the
watchmen in Much Ado.”45 Similarly, when the Slaughter House (1873) majority
insisted on distinguishing between national and state citizenship and the privileges
and immunities both afford, Burgess called the opinion “entirely erroneous,”46
lamenting that the Court had “thrown away the great gain in the domain of civil
liberty won by the terrible exertions of the nation in the appeal to arms.”47 For
Burgess, the past of slavery proved that we cannot trust individual states, which
are only local forms of government, to protect civil liberties. On the contrary, “[i]f
history ever taught anything, it is that civil liberty is national in origin, content and
sanction.”48 The Civil War was a turning point in history because, prior to it, the
United States was “lagging in the march of modern civilization”49 due to
“[s]lavery”50 and “State sovereignty.”51 But with “emancipation”52 and
“nationalization”53 the United States asserted “its supremacy, forevermore.”54

40. BURGESS, supra note 33, at 60.
41. DUNNING, supra note 37, at 105.
42. Id. at 109.
43. Id. at 111.
44. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1868), overruled in part by Morgan v. United
States, 113 U.S. 476 (1885).
45. John W. Burgess, The American Commonwealth: Changes in Its Relation to the Nation, 1 POL.
SCI. Q. 9, 11 (1886).
46. 1 BURGESS, supra note 16, at 228.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 224.
49. 1 JOHN W. BURGESS, THE CIVIL WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION, 1859–1865, at 135
(1901).
50. Id.
51. Id.
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Burgess’s views on Reconstruction both shaped and were shaped by his
theory of the nation, the state, and government. For him, a nation has geographic
and ethnic unity. Geographic unity means a “territory separated from other
territory”55 by a natural geographic boundary. Ethnic unity is a “population having
a common language and literature, a common tradition and history, a common
custom and a common consciousness of rights and wrongs. . . . Where the
geographic and ethnic unities coincide, or very nearly coincide, the nation is
almost sure to organize itself politically, —to become a state.”56
Relying on Johann Kaspar Bluntschli, Burgess defines a state as “a particular
portion of mankind viewed as an organized unit.”57 States have four
characteristics. They are “all-comprehensive.”58 Their organization “embraces all
persons, natural or legal, and all associations of persons.”59 There are no “stateless
persons within the territory of the state.”60 A state is also “exclusive.”61 The state
may constitute “two or more governments”62 and “assign to each a distinct sphere
of action . . . but there cannot be two organizations of the state for the same
population and within the same territory.”63 Third, “the state is permanent.”64 But
of all these characteristics, the most essential is sovereignty. Sovereign power,
Burgess insists, must be unlimited. Sovereignty is “that which imposes the
limitation.”65
Very similar to Laband’s, Meyer’s, and others’, Burgess’s definition is not at
all exceptional for anyone familiar with the German-speaking thought of the time.
But, because of American debates, Burgess, more than others, stressed the
distinction between the state and the governments that serve it. Sovereignty rests
in the state, not in governments. “[A] great deal of confusion,”66 he insists, results
from “the failure to distinguish between the state and the two governments”67 of a
federal system.
The individual is not a citizen of either government, but of the state back of
both. He derives his citizenship, with all its immunities and rights, from
the state; and the two governments have only the duty and the power of
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observing and protecting those immunities and rights, each in the sphere
assigned to it by the state.68
This distinction between the state and the government explains why
Burgess’s insistence on unlimited sovereign power is not inconsistent with the
Anglo-American tradition’s belief that civil liberties can be protected only by
limiting governmental power. Burgess acknowledges that governments can
threaten civil liberties. But the unlimited power of the state limits governments.
“[T]he government is not the sovereign organization of the state. Back of the
government lies the constitution; and back of the constitution the original
sovereign state, which ordains the constitution both of government and of
liberty.”69 According to Burgess, Laband, Otto von Holst, and Georg Jellinick
understand this attribute of sovereignty through their studies of the American
system.
There is, however, one situation in which Burgess’s distinction between the
government, the constitution, and the state temporarily breaks down. When, in
time of “war and public danger,”70 the “life of the state is threatened,”71 the
“central government may temporarily suspend the constitutional guarantees of
individual liberty and rule absolutely; i.e., assume the whole power of the state, the
sovereignty.”72 As Burgess makes clear, there are notable precedents for
suspending the constitution in order to save the state. But instead of relying on the
obvious example of “the great Roman state”73 or those “formed out of the
amalgamation of Teutonic and Roman ideas,”74 he prefers to evoke the example
of “the pure Germanic state.”75 Citing Caesar, he describes how “the ancient
liberty-loving Germans,”76 when needed, suspended “government by the
assemblies of the freemen”77 and allowed the “complete dictatorship of the
duke.”78 Like every Teutonic state before it, the United States, according to
Burgess, has provisions for such a “temporary dictatorship.”79 For instance,
noting that “Congress has the power to ordain universal military duty in the
United States, and provide for calling the entire population into the service of the
United States,”80 he concludes that the “entire population would be made subject
to the rules and regulations governing the army and navy . . . without regard to the
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system of civil liberty.”81 Admitting that “[t]his would . . . be an extraordinary
procedure,”82 he, nonetheless, insists on its constitutionality.83
Burgess was, therefore, an ardent supporter of Lincoln’s actions during the
war, as well as the use of military force to ensure loyalty by former Confederates
during Reconstruction. Despite his love of civil liberties, he was also a sharp critic
of the most important civil liberties case to come out of the Civil War. During the
war, Lambdin B. Milligan, an outspoken critic of Lincoln’s war effort, was accused
of conspiring with the Confederates. Denied habeas corpus, he was tried by a
military tribunal in his home state of Indiana and sentenced to hang. Not hanged
during the war, he appealed his case to the Supreme Court. In Ex parte Milligan,
the Court freed him in a unanimous decision, ruling that the president had no
authority to try a civilian in military courts when civil courts were open. According
to Justice David Davis, who delivered the Court’s opinion,
No graver question was ever considered by this court, nor one which
more nearly concerns the rights of the whole people . . . No doctrine,
involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of
man than that any of [the Constitution’s] provisions can be suspended
during any of the great exigencies of government. Such a doctrine leads
directly to anarchy or despotism . . . .84
To the objection that the military commission was justified by martial law,
Davis replied, “If this were true, it could be well said that a country, preserved at
the sacrifice of all the cardinal principles of liberty, is not worth the cost of
preservation.”85
Soon after World War I, Charles Warren noted that Ex parte Milligan had
been “long recognized as one of the bulwarks of American liberty.”86 Soon after
World War II, Allan Nevins ventured that “[t]he heart of this decision is the heart
of the difference between the United States of America and Nazi Germany or
Communist Russia.”87 But at the time, the decision was controversial. First, it
seemed retroactively to declare the military trial of Lincoln’s assassins
unconstitutional. Second, it raised questions about trying Jefferson Davis in a
military court. Third, although the Court unanimously declared the military
tribunal authorized by the president unlawful, it split over another, extremely
contentious, issue. Five justices ruled that not only the president, but also
Congress, had no constitutional power to create military tribunals of the sort that
tried Milligan. Their opinion provoked a strong dissent from the other four
justices, who argued that “in such a time of public danger, Congress had power,
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 118–19, 121 (1866).
85. Id. at 126.
86. 3 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 149 (1922).
87. Allan Nevins, The Case of the Copperhead Conspirator, in QUARRELS THAT HAVE SHAPED
THE CONSTITUTION 90, 101, 108 (John A. Garraty ed., 1964).
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under the Constitution,” to authorize military trials, even when civil courts were
open.88
Many worried that the majority’s ruling would hamstring Congress’s plans
for Radical Reconstruction. The Republican press went so far as to compare Ex
parte Milligan to Dred Scott as an example of the Supreme Court’s catering to
Southern interests. The comparison was not completely unfounded. Milligan, like
Dred Scott, limited congressional power. Dred Scott overruled the Missouri
Compromise, which gave Congress power over U.S. territories. Milligan limited
Congress’s power to establish military tribunals to try civilians. Both controversial
rulings were made in what at the time were considered dicta, not necessary for the
outcome of the case, by a five-justice majority. Furthermore, both majorities
justified their rulings in the name of civil liberties. If Milligan guaranteed citizens
the right to be tried in civil courts, Dred Scott was the first Supreme Court decision
to evoke the Bill of Rights to overturn congressional legislation. It did so when
Justice Taney cited the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to argue that
the Missouri Compromise deprived a U.S. citizen of “his liberty or property,
merely because he came himself or brought his property [a slave] into a particular
Territory of the United States.”89
That a case Nevins calls a “great triumph for the civil liberties of Americans
in time of war or internal dissension”90 was compared to Dred Scott by defenders
of African Americans indicates the extent to which proponents of Radical
Reconstruction believed in the authority of the national state. Burgess too felt that
the decision was very bad political science:
It is devoutly to be hoped that the decision of the Court may never be
subjected to the strain of actual war. If, however, it should be, we may
safely predict that it will necessarily be disregarded. In time of war and
public danger the whole power of the state must be vested in the general
government, and the constitutional liberty of the individual must be
sacrificed so far as the government finds it necessary for the preservation
of the life and security of the state. This is the experience of political
history and the principle of political science.91
For Burgess, “[t]he practices of the Administration are, therefore, to be
considered as the precedents of the Constitution in civil war rather than the
opinion of Court.”92 Picked up by Corwin, Burgess’s views on Milligan have
exerted influence long after he himself has been forgotten. To cite just one
example, Mark E. Neely, Jr., in his Pulitzer Prize-winning book on Lincoln’s
record on civil liberties, strategically quotes the same passage from Burgess used
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by Corwin in a chapter called “The Irrelevance of the Milligan Decision.”93 A
number of presidents, able to evoke the majestic example of Lincoln, have indeed
acted as if his practices are the true precedent.
Those presidents, or their defenders, can cite another of Burgess’s
pronouncements on the case to justify their actions. As much as Burgess disagrees
with the Court’s decision, he also points out that it recognizes “occasions upon
which the government can establish martial law, i.e. suspend all the constitutional
guaranties of individual liberty.”94 This is precisely the point John Yoo makes
about Milligan. According to Yoo, “[t]he Court recognized . . . that the
Constitution grants the government the power to respond to attack, and that this
includes the power to suspend habeas corpus or impose military rule in areas
under attack”; Yoo goes on to note that “Milligan’s protections do not reach
citizens who have actually joined enemy forces. Nor do they extend to detainees,
citizen or not, at the front or on battlefields abroad.”95 If they had, Confederate
soldiers—all of whom, according to Lincoln, were still American citizens—would
have had to be tried in civilian courts rather than handled by the military.
Compared to Burgess, Yoo is temperate, not going so far as explicitly to proclaim
that “the President must have despotic power when he wages war. The safety, the
life perhaps, of the state requires it.”96
IV.
Schmitt just missed meeting Burgess when he began his studies in Berlin, but
his understanding of the American system registers Burgess’s indirect influence.
Like many German speakers, Schmitt was fascinated by Calhoun, whose
“theoretical significance for the concepts of a constitutional theory of the
federation,” he declared, “[was] . . . still great and in no way settled by the fact that
in the war of secession the Southern states were defeated.”97 What attracted
Schmitt, however, was not Calhoun’s doctrine of states’ rights, but his belief that
sovereignty was absolute and indivisible. In fact, Schmitt’s understanding of
Calhoun’s historical impact is closer to what Burgess argued should have been the
case than what actually occurred. Although, as we have seen, the Supreme Court
continued to grant limited sovereignty to individual states, Schmitt believed that
after the Civil War, states were simply “organizational components of extensive
legislative autonomy and self-government.”98 Schmitt’s source turned out to be a

93. MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY 181 (1991). Neely claims that Burgess was
careful to limit his claim to the Civil War, which was unique in our history; but Burgess wrote with the
United States involved in another civil war involving the newly acquired Philippines. Id.
94. 1 BURGESS, supra note 16, at 249.
95. JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS 145–46 (2006).
96. 2 BURGESS, supra note 16, at 261.
97. CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 390 (Jeffrey Seitzer ed. & trans., Duke Univ.
Press 2008) (1928).
98. Id. at 392.
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book edited by Columbia University President N. Murray Butler, who was
profoundly influenced by Burgess.99
That Schmitt, a proponent of a strong central government, would want to
believe this view of the American scene is not surprising. But much more
important than Calhoun for his interventions into German debates was Lincoln.
In Die Diktator, Schmitt provides comprehensive historical analysis of the
constitutional dictatorship from the time of the Romans to the early twentieth
century alluded to by Burgess. He distinguishes between a kommissarische Diktator,
one who suspends the constitution in order to restore it, and a souveräne Diktator,
one who suspends it to change it.100 If Cromwell is a prime example of the latter,
the advocate of government of the people, by the people, and for the people is the
prime, recent example of the former. Lincoln believed he had to suspend civil
liberties because people intent on destroying the Constitution evoked its
protections to further their aims. Convinced that Germany faced a similar
situation, Schmitt felt that Lincoln was perfectly justified in suspending the
Constitution in order to save it. Whether Lincoln acted as Schmitt thought he did
is open to debate. Most of Lincoln’s defenders today deny that he actually
suspended the Constitution. Schmitt, however, was relying on views held by some
of the most respected figures of the time. For instance, in his influential American
Commonwealth, Lord Bryce cites a widely circulated statement Lincoln allegedly
made to Salmon Chase, who would later become Chief Justice and write the
minority opinion in Milligan: “These rebels are violating the Constitution to
destroy the Union. I will violate the Constitution if necessary to save the Union; I
suspect, Chase, that our Constitution is going to have a rough time of it before we
get done with this row.”101 Similarly, Dunning in Essays on the Civil War and
Reconstruction devotes an entire section to “[t]he Presidential Dictatorship,”102
adding later, in an uncritical tone, “In the interval between April 12 and July 4,
1861, a new principle thus appeared in the constitutional system of the United
States, namely, that of a temporary dictatorship.”103 Dunning even anticipates
Tushnet’s claim, inspired by Schmitt, that restraints on executive power during a
state of emergency come from public opinion, not rule by law. The only “limit”104
on Lincoln’s dictatorial power, Dunning observes, “was not the clear expressions
of the organic law, but the forbearance of a distracted people.”105

99. EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES (Nicholas Murray Butler ed., Am. Book Co. 1910)
(1900). Schmitt quotes from the German translation of this volume, which was prepared for the
United States exhibit at the Paris Exposition of 1900. Id.
100. CARL SCHMITT, DIE DIKTATUR 131–34 (7th ed. 2006).
101. ROSSITER, supra note 9, at 229 n.17.
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103. Id. at 20–21
104. Id. at 15.
105. Id.; see also Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime,
2003 WIS. L. REV. 273, 280–81, 284–85, 302 n.104, 307 (2003) (examining Lincoln’s exertion of
executive power during wartime).
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Thus, it is no surprise that in discussing martial law, Schmitt cites Ex parte
Milligan to justify the use of military tribunals. Paying no attention to the majority
opinion declaring them unconstitutional, he focuses, as does Yoo, on the Court’s
recognition of times when they are permissible. Most likely Schmitt did not read
the entire decision. But the sources he relies upon are revealing. One is James
Wilford Garner, a member of the “Dunning school” of Reconstruction studies,
whose account of Mississippi Du Bois singles out for its fairness. A professor at
the University of Illinois, Garner had a distinguished career, being named the
Hyde lecturer in French universities in 1921 and holding a similar visiting position
at the University of Calcutta. He wrote a comparative study of the German war
code, and used his understanding of the Civil War and Reconstruction to evaluate
Woodrow Wilson’s crackdown on civil liberties during World War I, just as
Dunning did in a widely read comparison of Wilson and Lincoln. Indeed, Wilson
himself wrote on the question of Reconstruction and sovereignty and reviewed
Burgess’s work.
Another of Schmitt’s sources was William Winthrop, a professor of law at
West Point, who noted that the validity of military tribunals was so widely
recognized that they were allowed to decide over two thousand cases during the
Civil War and Reconstruction.106 A third was Military Government and Martial Law,
written by William E. Birkheimer, who based his book on research he conducted
after he was asked to provide legal justification for his commanding officer’s
declaration of martial law in the Pacific Northwest to protect Chinese from violent
intimidation in 1886.107 Distinguishing between military government, which is
military control of enemy territory abroad, and martial law, which is a suspension
of civil law at home, Birkheimer evokes the precedent of Milligan to justify military
commissions at the same time that he praises the wisdom of Lincoln’s course
during the war.108 Significantly, for him the Reconstruction Acts were justified
only as declarations of martial law.109 To the objection that technically
Reconstruction was during a time of peace, he argues that, in fact, the South was
in a “state of latent rebellion.”110 He goes on to argue that if the military had used
the full force it was authorized to use, the country would have been spared the
“disagreeable experience [that] followed.”111 Almost the same point made by
Burgess, it is one that certainly would have impressed Schmitt, who tried to
convince Germans to use extraordinary powers to avoid a crisis of even more
severity.
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V.
As Schmitt’s references to the United States indicate, he has numerous
similarities with Burgess. Both were practicing lawyers as well as theorists. Both
assumed that sovereignty rested in individual nations that ideally had a
homogeneous ethnic make-up. This belief contributed to their racism. It also led
them to advocate centralization. Although both worked within federal systems,
neither recognized the sovereignty of individual “states” or “lands.” For both,
sovereignty was indivisible, absolute, and prior to rule by law. This meant that
both defended suspension of the constitutional order if necessary to save the state.
It also meant that, for both, legality alone was not enough to legitimate the state.
One of Schmitt’s most important contributions to any consideration of “law
as . . .” is his distinction between “legality” and “legitimacy.” Legality is gesetzmässig.
Legitimacy is rechtmässig.112 Legality is the realm of the bureaucrat and is concerned
with establishing a set of abstract, value-neutral, procedural norms. Legitimacy is
concerned with questions of right and pays attention to the concrete demands of
life. A legal system, Schmitt argues, can never find true legitimacy in abstract
legality. Burgess agreed. For instance, he favorably cites von Holtz, the Germanborn expert on the U.S. Constitution, when he mocks the “‘canonizing of the
constitution,’ i.e., the making of a political bible out of it.”113 A political system,
Burgess insists “cannot be perpetuated simply through the guaranty contained in
its written constitution.” Instead, “[w]e must go back of the constitution,” to find
the true foundation of the state.114
Because for Burgess, in the end, the Constitution was not the foundation of
the state, he disagreed with an attorney for Milligan, who argued that the president
“exercise[s] no authority whatever but that which the Constitution of the country
gives him. Our system knows no authority beyond or above the law.”115 Likewise,
he disagreed when another of Milligan’s lawyers, the Attorney General for
ineffective President Buchanan, claimed that “[a] violation of law on pretence of
saving such a government as ours is not self-preservation, but suicide.”116 On the
contrary, he would have agreed with Justice Jackson’s dissent in a landmark civil
liberties case soon after World War II that used a legal technicality to overturn the
conviction of a hate-spouting Nazi priest. Having recently served as prosecutor at
the Nuremberg war crimes tribunal, Justice Jackson pointed out the danger of
letting people like the priest exploit our protection of civil liberties in order to
destroy our democratic form of government: “There is a danger that, if the Court
does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert
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the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.”117 Discussing Milligan, Burgess
contrasts the proper “practical” response with the mistaken “judicial” response.118
Similarly, Schmitt argues that value neutrality in legal systems has no place when
its enemies push it to “the point of system suicide.”119
Those who agree that legality alone cannot serve as the foundation of rule by
law seek legitimacy somewhere other than in the forms of the law. As similar as
they are in this respect, Burgess and Schmitt seek it in different realms. Schmitt
turns to political theology, while Burgess turns to political science, one that he felt
could be based on scientific reason. Confidently announcing the “beginning of the
modern political era,”120 Burgess made the following declaration:
At last the state knows itself and is able to take care of itself. The fictions,
the makeshifts, the temporary supports, have done their work, and done
it successfully. They are now swept away. The structure stands upon its
own foundation. The state, the realization of the universal in man, in
sovereign organization over the particular, is at last established,–the
product of the progressive revelation of the human reason through
history.121
A proper understanding of the state depends upon a scientific exploration of the
“domains of geography and ethnography, the womb of constitutions and of
revolutions.”122
Today, it is all too easy to recognize how Burgess’s turn to geography and
ethnology links him to the period’s notorious scientific racism that offended Du
Bois. Burgess strongly believed that, for the government to fulfill the state’s duty
to protect the civil liberties of its citizens, political rights had to be restricted.
Convinced that the Teutonic people are “particularly endowed with the capacity
for establishing national states,”123 he concludes that “in a state whose population
is composed of a variety of nationalities the Teutonic element, when dominant,
should never surrender the balance of political power.”124 The “exercise of
political power”125 is not “a right of man,”126 and non-Teutonic elements should
be allowed to exercise it “only after the state shall have nationalized them
politically.”127 Whereas it is unfair to delay such nationalization, it is unwise to
“hasten the enfranchisement of those not yet ethnically qualified.”128 Indeed, one
reason Burgess advocated military rule during Reconstruction was because he so
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strongly opposed African American suffrage. To be sure, there is some truth to his
claim that radical Republicans insisted on giving the vote to freedmen in order to
guarantee Republican rule in the South. But Burgess’s response to that political
maneuver was extreme:
From the point of view of sound political science, the imposition of
universal negro suffrage upon the Southern communities, in some of
which the negroes were in a large majority, was one of the ‘blundercrimes’ of the century. There is something natural in the subordination of
an inferior race to a superior race, even to the point of enslavement of
the inferior race, but there is nothing natural in the opposite.129
As Schmitt’s example demonstrates, the turn to political theology does not
guard against racism. Nonetheless, for some it provides a much better explanation
of the workings of state power than attempts, like Burgess’s, to provide the
modern Rechtstaat with a secure foundation in scientific rationality. Thus,
conservative Schmitt has joined the honored company of leftist twentieth-century
thinkers who challenge progressive accounts of the triumph of rule by law as a
move from barbarism to civilization. Foucault, for instance, insists that “the law is
a calculated and relentless pleasure, delight in the promised blood, which permits
the perpetual instigation of new dominations and the staging of meticulously
repeated scenes of violence.”130 Benjamin, with his widely discussed “Critique of
Violence,” links law’s inherent violence to religious ritual. Benjamin, in turn, knew
and was influenced by Schmitt.131 They both argue that to understand the law, we
need to take into account what Derrida, in his own influential essay, calls “The
Mystical Foundations of Authority.”132 The attempt to transform law into a set of
value-free normative rules is to forget its sacred violent origins. We indulge in that
act of forgetting, we are told, at our own peril, and Schmitt’s political theology,
especially for those associated with the journal Telos, has become a vital tool in
diagnosing our present malaise. As Russell A. Berman (recent president of the
MLA) and Michael Marder put it, the “century of secular universalisms leaves us
in the state of a general and all-encompassing nihilism.”133 With unmistakable
echoes of the New Left, they contrast the “bureaucratic-legalistic” model of rule
by law and its abstract proceduralism to the true legitimacy of a political
community. Yet, like Benjamin, they search for hope in our situation. In “Theses
on the Philosophy of History,” Benjamin, alluding to Schmitt, describes the task
of bringing about a “real state of emergency [Ausnahmezustand]” that “will
129.
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improve our position in the struggle against Fascism.”134 Similarly, Berman and
Marder insist that “the collapse of everything that went under the name of the
New World Order could be a harbinger of ample opportunities for imagining new
and competing forms of legitimacy. Such would be the event of legitimacy in the
eclipse of legality.”135
I fully agree that neither efforts to produce a set of value-free procedural
norms nor those to ground law in scientific rationality are adequate to convince
people of the legitimacy of the state. As Lincoln knew, that goal requires an
effective appeal, which is why he evoked “bonds of affection” encompassing
battlefields, patriot graves, hearts, and hearthstones. If legality is more akin to the
realm of reason, legitimacy has affinities with the realm of myth. It requires
appeals to tradition and renewable symbols and stories of founding moments.
That said, I find appeals, like Berman’s, to Schmitt’s political theology as flawed as
Burgess’s appeal to political science.
The great myth of the enlightenment might have been the belief that human
beings could transcend the need for myth and place human institutions on a
rational foundation. But not all myths are the same. We still need to be wary of
what Ernst Cassirer, responding to Nazi Germany, called various “myths of
state.”136 As Blumenberg puts in the title of one of his most important books, we
need to work on and with myth.137 For that reason it is premature to dismiss the
modern Rechtstaat simply because of its inability to generate its own rational
foundation. If all human institutions had to demonstrate foundations in reason,
we would have very few institutions left. At times, perhaps, it is rational not to
demand too much rationality. Likewise, even if law had its origin in the sacred and
even though many people employ religious metaphors to describe the law, it does
not follow that we have to understand law today as a form of secularized theology.
There are alternatives.
To give one example from the historical period I am treating, Wilson, in his
review of Burgess, draws on a distinction very similar to Schmitt’s between legality
and legitimacy. Praising Burgess’s logical understanding of constitutional law,
which deals with “such part of political life as is operative within the forms of
law,” Wilson faults his understanding of “the actual facts of political life, the actual
phenomena of state growth.”138 Wilson does not, however, reject Burgess’s move
to political science. He simply gives a very different account of what it entails.
According to Wilson, political science deals with aspects of political life “lying

134. WALTER BENJAMIN, Theses on the Philosophy of History, in ILLUMINATIONS 253, 257
(Hannah Arendt ed., Harry Zohn trans., Schocken Books 1968) (1955).
135. Berman & Marder, supra note 133, at 3.
136. See ERNST CASSIRER, THE MYTH OF THE STATE (Murray Printing Co. 1961) (1946).
137. Robert M. Wallace, Introduction to HANS BLUMENBERG, WORK ON MYTH, at vii (Robert
M. Wallace trans., MIT Press 1985) (1979).
138. Woodrow Wilson, A System of Political Science and Constitutional Law, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
May 1891, at 695, 697.
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entirely outside the thought of the lawyer,” such as the way “states come into
existence, take historic shape, create governments and institutions, and at pleasure
change or discard what forms or laws they must in order to achieve
development.”139 Burgess’s limitation in dealing with those aspects is registered in
his style. While he writes in the “language of science,” political science demands
the “language of literature.”140 Wilson admits that great political scientists do not
“pretend to be making literature.”141 Nonetheless, he goes on, “they have no
choice; if they do not write literature, they do not write truth. For political science
cannot be truthfully constructed except by the literary method . . . .”142
As a literary critic, I am tempted to enlist Wilson to join numerous law and
literature scholars to argue for seeing law as literature. But elsewhere I have
identified various problems with that move, including the lack of clarity about
what we mean by literature.143 It is, for example, not clear precisely what Wilson
understands by the “language of literature.” I want to propose, instead, that we
understand law, as it has been since the Greeks, as rhetoric. There is of course
little new in that claim, and understanding law as rhetoric will produce neither the
certainty that Burgess wanted nor the decisiveness that Schmitt desired. It is also
no sure guard against dangerous myths of state. Nonetheless, insofar as it
acknowledges the need for persuasion, it allows for Blumenberg’s work on and
with myth. Indeed, some reasons for making this claim come into clearer focus
when we play Burgess’s appeal to political science off of Schmitt’s appeal to
political theology.
Schmitt faults legality for lacking attention to life. But that charge cannot be
leveled against law conceived as rhetoric. One fact of life is the need to act. Even
though human beings inevitably fall short of their aspiration to base actions on
rationality, not instinct, we still need to act. As a result, in many situations, we
have learned to rely on rhetoric, whose “axiom,” Blumenberg argues, is “the
principle of insufficient reason.”144 This is especially true of law in which norms
need to be established and decisions rendered with no certainty as to what is right.
Rhetoric’s function helps account for the limits of thinking of law as science,
not only in Burgess’s case, but also in present efforts to draw on the “science” of
economics. For example, describing his position as juridical skepticism, Judge
Richard Posner admits that the law is not an autonomous discipline that can find
within itself grounds for legal policy. He then goes on to seek those grounds in
economics.145 But sophisticated modern scientists know that their knowledge is
139. Id. at 695.
140. Id. at 699.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Brook Thomas, Reflections on the Law and Literature Revival, 17 CRITICAL INQUIRY 510, 511
(1991).
144. Hans Blumenberg, An Anthropological Approach to the Contemporary Significance of Rhetoric, in
AFTER PHILOSOPHY: END OR TRANSFORMATION? 429, 447 (Kenneth Baynes et al. eds., 1987).
145. Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 890–91 (1988).
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not certain. Thus, the scientific community has learned “to put up with the
provisional character of its results indefinitely.”146 Law cannot afford that luxury.
The results of science can, and probably should, be appealed to, but because they
are always provisional, we still need to ask whether they should be the basis for
legal actions. The authority for legal action, in other words, is always open to
rhetorical dispute, a rhetoric that is not controlled by transcendental principles or
scientific laws. “The decisive difference” between rhetoric and science, according
to Blumenberg, “lies in the dimension of time; science can wait, or is subject to
the convention of being able to wait, whereas rhetoric . . . presupposes, as a
constitutive element of its situation” the necessity to act while “[l]acking definitive
evidence.”147
Of course, Schmitt’s political theology understands the need to act. An
advocate of decisionism, Schmitt argues that to understand a legal system we must
look to the decisions made, not the norms articulated. Nonetheless, for him the
answer does not lie in rhetoric. On the contrary, he is part of a long antirhetorical,
antidemocratic tradition beginning with Plato. Schmitt is, for instance, strongly
influenced by Hobbes, who objected to democracy because it relies on rhetoric to
make decisions more “by a certain violence of mind” than by a right reason.148
Likewise, in The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (1923), Schmitt criticizes modern
mass democracies for their partisan politics. Disgusted with people whose primary
loyalty seems to be to their political parties rather than the good of the state, he
accuses them of being unwilling to “concede the force of the better argument.”149
Thus, Schmitt turns to a single individual, the president—elected by all of the
people—as the defender of the constitution, granting him the sovereign power to
declare the state of exception.
Schmitt’s state of exception might seem to point to the limits of rhetoric. If
it makes sense to understand law as rhetoric rather than science because of the
need to act, an emergency demands action that cannot wait for rhetorical
deliberation. Nonetheless, a flaw in Schmitt’s argument becomes apparent if we
turn to Burgess. Like Schmitt, Burgess recognizes that the initial response and
reaction to an emergency must come from the executive, who in such cases has
“despotic power.”150 Criticizing the majority decision in Ex parte Milligan for
allowing local courts to decide the state of emergency, he writes that it
would place in the hands of a relatively insignificant and irresponsible
official the power of life and death over the state, in times of its greatest
peril. War is the solution of a question by force; and this proposition
would introduce into the process, at its most critical point, the pettiest
kind of legalism. Scientifically, the view is weak and narrow; practically, it
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Blumenberg, supra note 144, at 437.
Id. at 437, 441.
Id. at 452.
SCHMITT, supra note 97, at 29.
2 BURGESS, supra note 96, at 261.
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cannot be realized. The commander has only to close the court-room,
and place a guard at the door, and this criterion of war or peace will be
made to conform to the determinations of power.151
With its realistic understanding of the “determinations of power” and its
attack on the “pettiest kind of legalism,” this account could well be written by
Schmitt. But, unlike Schmitt, Burgess does not grant the president sovereignty.
The president may be the first to act but that does not mean that his actions are in
the end legitimate. “[I]f Congress wills otherwise,” Burgess points out, “it has the
constitutional power to render the president’s act null and void, to treat it as an
usurpation and to remove him from his office.”152
Alluding here as much to Congress’s battles with President Johnson over
Reconstruction as to Lincoln, Burgess’s example reveals his affinity, if not total
agreement, with advocates of rule by law, such as Bruce Ackerman and David
Cole, who insist that the decision to end emergency power should not rest with
those who exercise it.153 Acutely attuned to the need to act decisively, Burgess also
knows that the person charged with an initial response need not be considered
sovereign. This crucial difference between Burgess and Schmitt reveals a problem
with the latter’s claims about political theology. Rather than provide an accurate
description of a historical process, Schmitt’s argument about the state’s use of
secularized theological concepts turns out to be a rhetorical ploy to legitimate his
authoritarian desire to give a single individual sovereign control over partisan
politics. Indeed, Schmitt’s American examples reveal the historical inaccuracy of
his argument about political theology. For instance, he asserts that nineteenthcentury Americans believed that “the voice of the people is the voice of God.”154
But Lieber explicitly states that “‘Vox populi, vox Dei,’ cannot be endorsed.”155
Even more telling is Schmitt’s claim that “[t]he exception in jurisprudence is
analogous to the miracle in theology.”156 Just as deism “banished the miracle from
the world,”157 so rationalist defenders of the “modern constitutional state”158
refuse to acknowledge the necessity of the exception.159 But what are we to do
with Burgess, a rationalist defender of the modernist constitutional state if there
ever was one, and his defense of the exception? One thing I hope is that we use
him to note the audacity of Schmitt’s comparison of the sovereign’s declaration of

151. 1 BURGESS, supra note 16, at 250.
152. John W. Burgess, The Relation of the Constitution of the United States to Newly Acquired Territory,
15 POL. SCI. Q. 381, 387 (1900).
153. Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1030 (2004); David
Cole, Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual Rights in Times of Crisis, 101 MICH. L. REV.
2565, 2565–66 (2002).
154. SCHMITT, supra note 4, at 49.
155. MERRIAM, JR., supra note 32, at 173 n.511.
156. SCHMITT, supra note 4, at 36.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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martial law with a divine miracle. Schmitt’s claims for political theology depend on
such analogies.
Acknowledging that dependency, Bonnie Honig affirms Schmitt’s metaphor
of the exception as a miracle but offers a different version of political theology by
drawing on Franz Rosenzweig’s account of miracle while extolling the “miracle of
metaphor.”160 But over forty years ago, Blumenberg offered a different way of
understanding Schmitt metaphorically. Noting Schmitt’s assertion that “[a]ll my
statements on the subject of political theology have been the assertions of a legal
scholar about a systematic structural kinship between theological and juristic
concepts,”161 Blumenberg points out that a structural kinship is not necessarily a
relation of secularization. Secularization occurs when concepts that are originally
theological determine how a realm outside of theology conceives of itself. But in
Schmitt’s case the terms he uses are “not determined by the system of what is
available for borrowing but rather by the requirements of the situation in which
the choice is being made.”162 The theological tradition makes available to Schmitt
metaphors that allow him to create an aura of legitimacy for his authoritarian
views of sovereignty. Thus, Schmitt’s “[p]olitical theology,” Blumenberg
concludes, “is a metaphoric theology: the quasi-divine person of the sovereign
possesses legitimacy, and has to possess it, because for him there is no longer
legality, or not yet, since he has first to constitute or to reconstitute it.”163
Schmitt may use metaphorical theology rather than political theology to
legitimate his theory of sovereignty, but at least its results are concrete. We have
no doubt who is sovereign. In contrast, Burgess’s use of “science” to legitimate
the sovereignty of the state seems hopelessly abstract. As important as Burgess’s
distinction between the government and the state is, it leaves us unclear about
what precisely constitutes the state. Who or what actually imposes the limit?
Wilson noted this problem. A Democrat of his time, he was much more
sympathetic to the doctrine of “states’ rights” than Burgess.164 But he does not go
so far as to grant individual states sovereignty. Making a fine distinction, he grants
them “dominion,” reserving “sovereignty” for the federal state.165 He does not

160. BONNIE HONIG, EMERGENCY POLITICS 90 (2009).
161. HANS BLUMENBERG, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE MODERN AGE 94 (Robert M. Wallace
trans., MIT Press 1983) (1966).
162. Id. at 93.
163. Id. at 101. On Blumenberg and Schmitt, see BLUMENBERG & SCHMITT, supra note 112.
See generally Graham Hammill, Blumenberg and Schmitt on the Rhetoric of Political Theology, in POLITICAL
THEOLOGY AND EARLY MODERNITY 84, 84–99 (Graham Hammill & Julia Reinhard Lupton eds.,
2012); Anselm Haverkamp, Richard II, Bracton, and the End of Political Theology, 16 LAW & LITERATURE
313 (2004). For the importance of metaphor for Blumenberg, see HANS BLUMENBERG, PARADIGMS
FOR A METAPHOROLOGY (Robert Savage trans., Cornell Univ. Press 2010) (1960).
164. WOODROW WILSON, Political Sovereignty, in AN OLD MASTER AND OTHER POLITICAL
ESSAYS 61, 90–95 (New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons 1893).
165. Id. Wilson was from the Old Dominion state. His distinction between dominion and
sovereignty most likely owes something to Britain’s establishment of various white dominions in the
empire that still owed sovereignty to the monarchy. In debates at the time of the American
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stop there. For him, sovereignty cannot be located by general reference to the
state, as it can for Burgess.166 Sovereignty is, instead, “the highest political power
in the state.”167 For Wilson, this means “the highest originative or law-making
body of the state.”168 By granting sovereignty to the “law-making organ” of the
state, Wilson self-consciously counters ideas of popular sovereignty.169 To be sure,
he admits,
In a very profound sense law proceeds from the community. . . . But law
issues thus from the body of the community only in vague and inchoate
form. It must be taken out of the sphere of voluntary and uncertain
action and made precise and invariable. It becomes positive law by
receiving definition and being backed by an active and recognized power
within the state.170
Wilson locates sovereignty in the law-making organ of the state. Schmitt
locates it in the president. The concreteness of both highlights the vagueness of
Burgess’s theory. But, before we dismiss Burgess’s notion of the state as a
hopeless metaphysical abstraction, it is worth trying to ascertain the rhetorical role
it plays within his system. That role, I would like to suggest, is very similar to the
role legal fictions play in the law. Necessary to allow a legal system to function,
legal fictions are one more reminder that the law cannot construct its own rational
foundation. To be sure, Burgess would have resisted that comparison, since he
believed that science had allowed him to transcend the scaffolding of fictions. In
contrast, Schmitt had an astute awareness of their necessity. In one of his first
publications, he defines a fiction as a “self-consciously arbitrary or false
assumption” whose “value and justification” lie in “its unavoidable
indispensability for the practice of thought and communication.”171 As we have
Revolution, James Wilson anticipated the granting of dominion status by arguing that members of the
British Empire were “independent of each other, but connected together under the same sovereign in
right of the same crown.” ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN
FEDERALISM 119 (2010) (quoting 2 JAMES WILSON, Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the
Legislative Authority of the British Parliament, in THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 501, 542 (James DeWitt
Andrews ed., Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1896)). Wilson, in turn, was likely appropriating Blackstone’s
claim, noted by Michael Meranze at the symposium, that because the colonies were conquered
territory, “the common law of England, as such, has no allowance or authority there; they being no
part of the mother country, but distinct (though dependent) dominions.” Michael Meranze, Hargrave’s
Nightmare and Taney’s Dream, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 219, 224 (2014) (quoting 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND § 4, at 105 (William S. Hein & Co.
1922) (1765)). Wilson made an even stronger claim for dominion status by denying Blackstone’s
further claim that the colonies were, nonetheless, subject to “the control of parliament.” Id. These
arguments serve as background to Justice Marshall’s declaration of Native American tribes as
“domestic dependent nations,” and the Supreme Court’s declaration of the Insular territories as
foreign in the domestic sense. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
166. WILSON, supra note 164, at 94.
167. Id. at 90.
168. Id. at 90–91.
169. Id. at 95.
170. Id.
171. BLUMENBERG & SCHMITT, supra note 112, at 301–02 (my translation).
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seen, rhetorically Schmitt’s account of sovereignty as political theology helps him
create a myth of legitimacy for the decisive actions of an individual over the
muddled workings of partisan politics.
Burgess’s account of sovereignty functions very differently. His failure to
name with precision what constitutes the state makes his account uncannily
compatible with William Connolly’s very up-to-date critique of Schmitt and
Agamben. According to Connolly, we need to think of sovereignty without a
definite location; we need to think of sovereignty with no doer behind the deed.
Not located in one person or governmental body, sovereignty for Connolly is an
assemblage of various actors and comes into being only after sovereign acts have
been performed.172 If this sounds paradoxical, it is, constituting what Connolly
and Bonnie Honig call the generative “paradox of politics.”173 In Burgess’s hands,
that paradox allows him to limit governmental power by granting unlimited power
to the state. Indeed, as counterintuitive as it is for critics of state power, for
Burgess the legal fiction of the state serves an equitable function.
Like Schmitt’s definition of sovereignty, equity is concerned with the
exception. Acknowledging that law, a product of human beings, is inevitably
flawed, Aristotle introduced the concept of equity to provide remedies for those
cases in which the norms of even fair systems can produce injustices. But, because
it deals with the exceptional, equity can never be properly institutionalized. As a
result, especially in English-speaking countries, equity was traditionally associated
with the Crown, since only the sovereign was considered to have the authority to
disregard human-made law to deal with exceptional cases. Schmitt’s link between
the sovereign and the exception works within the same conceptual framework,
and, although attempts to institutionalize equity inevitably fail, we have residues of
the old system. Richard Posner, for instance, in one of his most decisionist
moments, claims that equitable remedies are available through the discretionary
power of judges.174 More directly, the former link between equity and the
sovereign accounts for the pardoning power granted to the president in the
Constitution. It is no accident that Lincoln, who declared exceptional powers
during wartime, also had a reputation as the great pardoner. But the most
important role that equity plays today is rhetorical. Even without actual
institutions of equity, the metaphor remains, marking the limits to the law and
providing a perspective to criticize unjust outcomes. For Burgess, the sovereign
state—which marks the limits of both law and the government—serves that

172. WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, PLURALISM 131–60 (2005).
173. Id. at 145; HONIG, supra note 160, at xvi. Just as Honig endorses Schmitt’s metaphor of
the miracle for the state of exception, id. at 90, so Connolly accepts his definition of the sovereign
with one substitution, CONNOLLY, supra note 172, at 145. For Connolly, the sovereign is “that which
decides an exception.” Id. I take issue with both the metaphor and the definition.
174. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 113
(1988).
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function, allowing him to criticize specific laws, Supreme Court decisions, and
governmental actions while still defending the modern Rechtstaat.
Although equity points to a limit of law, equity has its own limitations when
it comes to assuring justice. As noble as appeals to it sound, there is no agreement
about what is equitable. Thus, when George Washington Cable responded to the
civil rights cases in 1883 by arguing for equal citizenship for African Americans in
an essay called “The Freedman’s Case in Equity,” Henry Grady responded with
“In Plain Black and White,” claiming that the truly equitable solution was separate
but equal segregation.175 Burgess’s sovereign state may serve an equitable function,
but there is no guarantee that it is in fact equitable. What is equitable is always
open to rhetorical debate.
Indeed, Burgess is not the only one to use the “legal fiction” of the state
rhetorically. When Berman claims that political theology serves as the “marker of
the inescapable limitation on politics and state power,” what he really means is
governmental power exercised in the name of the state. But for Berman to argue
for limitations on governmental power would be to sound very much like the
liberalism he rejects. To give one example, a 1946 Life editorial characterizes
liberalism by its beliefs that government needs to acknowledge some outside limit
to its power and that no political system—not even those based on rationality—
can offer perfect answers.176 To make a case for limitations on governmental
power would also require attention to different organs of the government, such as
the executive, legislative, and judicial, as well as (in the United States) the national
and state governments. As the examples from the post-Civil War era amply
demonstrate, these different organs are often in conflict. In contrast, to call for
limits on “state” power allows the construction of simplified narratives about
power emanating from a unified source. For instance, in their influential book
about race in the United States, Omi and Winant assert—without proving—
“Despite all the forces working at cross-purposes within the state . . . the state still
preserves an overall unity.”177 No one responsive to the complicated legal history
of race and Reconstruction, with its conflict between the sovereignty of the
national state and individual states, could make that statement.
My point is not that we need to eliminate the legal fiction of the state. On
the contrary, I find Agamben as naïve as Burgess on the possibility of doing
without fictions when, in The State of Exception, he argues that the answer to the
abuse of power is to “halt the machine” that “is leading the West toward global
civil war,” by exposing the “fiction” of the “very concepts of state and law.”178 If
fictions are necessary, exposing them as fictions will not eliminate them. What we
175. George Washington Cable, The Freedman’s Case in Equity, 29 CENTURY MAG. 409, 412–13
(1885); Henry W. Grady, In Plain Black and White, 29 CENTURY MAG. 909, 909–10 (1885).
176. Editorial, What Is “Liberalism”?, LIFE, Jan. 7, 1946, at 25, 26.
177. MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES 84
(2d ed. 1994).
178. AGAMBEN, supra note 10, at 87.
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can do, however, is try our best to understand the function of different fictions of
the state. Rhetorically, they can serve both proponents of state power, like
Burgess, and critics of state power influenced by Schmitt, like Berman, because
both need some way to mark limits. Thus, I want to close with a brief comparison
of the rhetorical effects of Schmitt’s definition of sovereignty in terms of the
exception and Burgess’s in terms of the limit, followed by a look at three
controversial legal issues today in which, it seems to me, Burgess’s definition
proves more helpful than Schmitt’s.
VI.
“Exception” implies a norm. An Ausnahme, it is the “taking out” of an
example that does not fit. Its connotations are primarily temporal, as indicated by
another German term, Ausnahmefall, which means an “exceptional incident.” This
temporal dimension served Schmitt’s purposes well since he felt that the situation
in Germany had become an Ausnahmezustand, a “state of emergency,” requiring the
declaration of martial law. In contrast, “limitation’s” connotations are equally
spatial and temporal. We have limits to a territory as well as to time. The spatial
dimension served Burgess well in post-Civil War debates over whether the nation
or “states” should have jurisdiction over a particular territory. The temporal
dimension allowed his theory of sovereignty to accommodate the state of
emergency. To be sure, the temporal and the spatial are not in strict opposition.
Schmitt, for instance, calls his definition a Grenzbegriff, a border concept, with
Grenze meaning a border or a limit.179 For Schmitt, the exception marks the limit
of attempts to base rule by law on a set of rational norms.
In the post-9/11 world, Agamben has drawn on Schmitt to argue that the
exception has become the norm. That view is encouraged by the English
translation of Political Theology, which uses “exception” to refer to Schmitt’s varying
deployment of Ausnahme, Ausnahmefall, and Ausnahmezustand. Thus, although
Schmitt’s definition of the sovereign refers to the very specific case of the
Ausnahmezustand, it comes across in English as referring to the exception in
general. As much as the rhetoric of Schmitt’s argument encourages the conflation
of these three terms, the English translation is unfortunate. After all, it is one thing
to note that we are in exceptional times. It is quite another to say that those times
are so exceptional that martial law must be declared. Despite numerous
descriptions of the country being in a perpetual state of emergency, I follow Hans
Kellner in arguing that we should not, as Schmitt and his followers tend to do,
collapse the productive tension between the exception and the norm by turning
the exception into the norm. Capable of accommodating temporary moments of
the state of exception without jettisoning the important function of normativity in
the law, Burgess’s much more conventional definition of sovereignty in terms of
the limit seems to be more productive in today’s world.
179.
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If the exception implies a norm, limitation implies something “above or
beyond” that can impose the limit. In a Christian context that thing was God.
Thus, Giordano Bruno was burned at the stake over the idea of infinity, the
possibility that the world of the here and now has no limits. Despite Schmitt’s
claims about political theology, however, Burgess’s sovereign state does not
function in the same manner as God. With unlimited authority, God knows no
bounds. In contrast, Burgess’s state is bounded. It has unlimited authority only
over a limited territory. That authority is beneficial for those living within that
territory, Burgess believed, because of the legal norms that govern it. But those
norms do not apply to people beyond the limits of the state’s jurisdiction. For at
least three controversial constitutional issues in today’s America, injustice is more
likely to be perpetuated by limiting—even relinquishing—sovereignty than by
asserting it in Schmittian fashion.
My first example is the detention and trying of terrorist suspects at
Guantanamo. Despite clarification in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), a
number of people continue to believe that the denial of full constitutional
protections to the accused resulted from a sovereign assertion of the “exception.”
On the contrary, the Bush administration’s legal argument was based on the fact
that, because Guantanamo is leased and not technically sovereign U.S. territory,
full constitutional guarantees were not required. Historically, it is important to
remember that the lease for Guantanamo grew out of the imperialism of the
Spanish-American War. Although it did not acquire Cuba, the United States
arranged for the permanent lease of a naval base there. In the meantime, in the
Insular Cases, the Supreme Court gave Congress plenary power over the
territories the nation did acquire, denying their residents full constitutional
protections because the territories were not fully incorporated into the country.180
Given Burgess’s defense of the state’s unlimited sovereign power, it might seem
that he would have endorsed the Court. On the contrary, he was outraged,
appalled that it did not honor the sovereign duty to protect the civil liberties of all
within its territory.181 Understanding this logic, the Bush administration
recognized that the best way to deny constitutional protections was to relinquish a
claim to sovereignty, not to assert it.
The fact that imperial expansion relies on the assertion of sovereignty at the
same time that relinquishment of it can lead to what many consider human rights
abuses should make it clear that state power is neither the benevolent force that
Burgess posits nor the unmitigated evil that its critics decry. Even the use of

180. A number of Americans assume that the absence of judicial review makes plenary power
an example of the state of exception. It is not. The state of exception is a state of emergency when the
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emergency powers is double edged. Although its potential for abuse is obvious, in
the Reconstruction and post-Reconstruction period it was used to combat the Ku
Klux Klan and, as Birkheimer makes clear, to protect Chinese immigrants from
lynching. Indeed, one reason this period is so helpful for a consideration of issues
of sovereignty is that it dramatizes a paradox that continues to have consequences
today. On the one hand, Reconstruction failed in large measure because the
national state, for various reasons, did not fully assert the sovereignty it won in the
Civil War over individual “states.” On the other, when it asserted that sovereignty
in immigration, Native American affairs, and the Spanish-American War, it
frequently did so with great injustice.182
Involving immigration, my second example shows the extent to which we
are still living in the wake of that paradox. Prior to the Chinese Exclusion Acts, a
national state apparatus to control immigration barely existed. Indeed, individual
states alone often handled immigration. But with the Acts of 1882 and 1892 the
national government asserted control and claimed the right both to exclude and to
deport aliens. When Chinese protested, the Supreme Court, citing the doctrine of
national sovereignty, sided with the government. Burgess fully agreed, appealing to
a state’s right to protect “its nationality against the deleterious influences of
foreign immigration.”183 But there was an unexpected consequence of this
assertion of unlimited sovereignty. In United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649
(1898), the U.S. government tried to deny birthright citizenship to the son of a
Chinese couple living in San Francisco. Wong Kim Ark pointed to the citizenship
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, noting that he had been born in this
country. But the government argued that, because his parents were subjects of
China, he was not, as the amendment requires, fully subject to U.S. jurisdiction.
Indeed, it was no accident that the government’s attorney was an ex-Confederate
who continued to believe in limitations on national sovereignty. In contrast, Wong
Kim Ark’s lawyers cited pro-Reconstruction Charles Sumner and the need for one
supreme sovereignty.184 The Court agreed with Wong Kim Ark. Today, those
wanting to deny birthright citizenship to children of illegal immigrants dispute the
ruling in Wong Kim Ark. They do so by adopting an argument similar to that of the
ex-Confederate governmental attorney in 1898. They too deny the national state
unlimited sovereign authority over all of the people in its territory.
My final example deals with another provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Some important Reconstruction cases defining the relation between

182. Constitutionally this divide can be traced to the Slaughter House Cases. See Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). By defining the privileges and immunities of U.S. citizenship so
narrowly, the Supreme Court left the control of many domestic relations to individual states. But the
national government still—and with increased authority—governed relations with immigrants, Native
American tribes, and other countries.
183. 1 BURGESS, supra note 16, at 43.
184. Lucy E. Salyer, Wong Kim Ark: The Contest Over Birthright Citizenship, in IMMIGRATION
STORIES 51, 73 (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005).
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the nation and the individual state, such as Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700 (1869), had
to do with the debt the Confederate government and individual states accrued
during the Civil War. Given Lincoln’s legal fiction that states had never left the
union, those debts raised a thorny legal issue. As a result, Section 4 of the
Fourteenth Amendment unconditionally recognizes the “validity of the public
debt of the United States” while forbidding the United States or any individual
state from assuming or paying “any debt or obligation incurred in aid of
insurrection or rebellion against the United States.”185 As with other measures of
the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 4 affirms national sovereignty. Indeed, as
frequent references to “sovereign debt” to describe today’s financial crisis in the
Eurozone confirm, a crucial component of sovereignty is control of a nation’s
debt. Much of the resentment from Greek citizens, for instance, comes from their
sense that the European Union is imposing limits on how their country deals with
its debt. Thus, when in 2012 Republicans threatened not to honor the U.S. debt,
they were, in effect, arguing to limit U.S. sovereignty. To be sure, some might
claim that the size of the debt has become such a crisis that the Constitution
should be disregarded and a state of emergency declared. We might, then, turn to
Schmitt to ask who has the power to declare such an emergency. But the very
question points to a problem with his definition of sovereignty. Even though
massive debt contributed to the crisis of the Weimar government, it is unlikely
that even Schmitt would have wanted to attribute that “sovereign debt” to the
individual declaring an Ausnahmezustand.
I hope that this and other examples I have raised through my historically
based rhetorical analysis have persuaded at least some that, as indebted to Schmitt
as we are for provocative questions about sovereignty, there are major limitations
to his account of political theology and the state of exception.

185.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4.
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